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Demonstratives and the Audience-Control Theory
Triinu Eesmaa
Introduction
The aim of  this thesis is to defend the audience-control theory of  demonstratives. According
to the audience-control theory, the semantic content of  a demonstrative in a context is what
an attentive and competent audience would reasonably take to be its semantic content on the
basis of  cues that she could take the speaker to be exploiting. Versions of  the audience-
control theory has been defended by Howard K. Wettstein (1984) and Komarine Romdenh-
Romluc (2002, 2004). However, the theory has remained quite unpopular and the
counterarguments that have been presented against it have not been addressed in the
literature. In this thesis, I will respond to these counterarguments.
Altogether, five arguments have been made against the audience-control theory. Three of
these arguments can be responded to by relying on the existing framework of  the audience-
control theory. The other two arguments require clarifying what the audience-control theory
would predict about the semantic content in certain situations where communication fails, i.e.
in situations where at least a part of  the audience does not grasp the content that is intended
by the speaker, but reasonably thinks that the content is different. These arguments are what I
will call the argument from underspecification and the argument from cases of  misleading.
I will present two ways to respond to these two arguments. The first response is what I will
call the indeterminacy response, which responds to problem by arguing that in cases where
there are several things that can be reasonably identified as the content of  the demonstrative
by the audience, the audience-control theory predicts that it is indeterminate what the
demonstrative refers to. The second is the content relativist response, which rests on the
rejection of  an assumption that the counterarguments rely on. This assumption is that there is
a unique content for a given use of  a demonstrative. If  a proponent of  the audience-control
theory is to drop this assumption, then they ought to adopt content relativism about
demonstratives. According to content relativism about demonstratives, if  there are multiple
ways that an audience can reasonably interpret a demonstrative on a usage event, then the
demonstrative has different contents relative to different members of  the audience on that
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usage event. After having outlined the two responses, I will provide an assessment of  them by
considering how well they are suited to handle cases where disagreements about what a
demonstrative refers to are revealed to the interlocutors.  Content relativism about
demonstratives enables us to explain more precisely what is going on in cases where
interlocutors disagree about what a demonstrative refers to. However, considerations about
how speakers behave when disagreements about content are revealed seem to favour the
indeterminacy response.
There are two broader projects that this thesis is a part of. Responding to the
counterarguments provides a way of  putting the audience-control theory on par with the
speaker-control theory, according to which speaker's intentions fix what a demonstrative refers
to. Compared to the audience-control theory, the speaker-control theory has gained a lot of
attention. Often, the audience-control theory is not even considered as an option. Thus, the
thesis will be an attempt to broaden the range of  available theories of  demonstratives. The
thesis can also be seen as a part of  the broader program of  speech act relativism. Speech act
pluralism is the view according to which by uttering a sentence, the speaker says more than
just one thing. On a particular version of  speech act pluralism, the set of  propositions
expressed can also vary between contexts of  interpretation. Relative to one interpreter, the
speaker says one thing, relative to another, she says something else. So content relativism is
very similar to speech act pluralism. Cappelen and Lepore (2015) have argued that the
theoretical utility of  what they call speech act pluralism has not been fully recognized. The
thesis can be seen as a part of  the project of  exploring what the theoretical potential of
content relativism/ speech act pluralism is.
The thesis will have the following structure. In the first section, I will give a brief  introduction
to the semantics of  demonstratives and narrow the range of  theories under consideration to
just those theories that aim to account for the semantics of  all demonstratives, including so
called true demonstratives like 'this', 'that', 'he', 'she', etc. I will also outline an important
methodological requirement for semantic theories. The requirement is that a semantic theory
has to make predictions about the semantic properties of  expressions, as used in particular
cases, which systematically correlate with the intuitions which competent speakers of  the
language have about the semantic properties of  those expressions in those cases. 
In the second section, I will introduce the audience-control theory. An upside of  this theory is
that it relies on publicly accessible features of  the speech situation and that it makes correct
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predictions in a wide range of  cases where demonstratives are used. In the third section, I will
consider three counterarguments and respond to them. In the fourth section, I will present
two further counterarguments. The first of  these counterarguments – the underspecification
argument – is the worry that there are situations where a demonstrative is used, but the
audience-control theory fails to make a prediction because it does not specify relative to which
audience the content of  the demonstrative is fixed. The second counterargument – the
argument from cases of  misleading – is that the audience-control theory makes the wrong
prediction in cases where a demonstrative is used in misleading an audience. 
In the fifth and final section, I will respond to these two arguments. There are two responses
that a proponent of  the audience-control theory can adopt in order to tackle these
counterarguments – the indeterminacy response and the content relativist response. In this
section, I will also assess these responses.
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1 Semantics of  Demonstratives
Reese and Paul are standing in line at a bakery and admiring the selection of  cakes and pastries
on display. Pointing at an extravagantly decorated cupcake, Paul says, 'That looks just delicious!
I want one of  those.' Reese grins at the sight of  Paul's excitement and says, 'Okay, Paul, I'll get
you this one, and I'll get myself  that one,' pointing at a chocolate éclair. When we direct our
attention to the words that are used in this situation, we can see that some of  the words – 'I',
'that', 'those', 'you', 'this', 'myself' – are used to talk about different things on different uses.
When Paul says 'I', he is talking about himself, and when Reese uses 'I', she is saying
something about herself. She can talk about Paul when she switches the pronoun to 'you'. It
seems that 'that' and 'this' can be used to talk about anything that the speaker wants to talk
about. The mentioned expressions exemplify a class of  context-sensitive expressions –
demonstratives.1 Demonstratives also include expressions such as 'she', 'he', 'we', 'they', 'it',
'today', 'tomorrow', 'now', 'here', 'actual' etc.
There is a sense in which, although a demonstrative can refer to different things on different
uses, it still always has the same meaning. For example, its not that 'you' changes meaning
when it is used to address different people. Unlike expressions such as 'bank' or 'bat', it's not
ambiguous. This suggests that the meanings of  demonstratives are not identical with what
they refer to. If  that is so, then how should we characterize the meanings of  demonstratives?
It is apparent that demonstratives display striking systematicity in how they refer. For example,
'today' always seems to refer to the day on which it is uttered. 'I' always refers to the speaker,
and 'now' to the time of  the utterance. It seems that for every utterance which includes a
demonstrative, the demonstrative has a referent that systematically depends on the features of
the context in which the utterance takes place. This suggests that there is an element of  the
semantics of  demonstratives which is stable and determines the referent for different uses of
the demonstrative, given some features of  the context in which it is used. A semantic theory
of  demonstratives has to account for this systematicity. That is, it has to minimally give
answers to three interrelated questions:
1 It is common to divide this class of  expressions into indexicals (such as 'I', 'today', 'tomorrow') and true
demonstratives (such as 'he', 'she', 'this', 'that'). Usually it is thought that the referents of  (pure) indexicals are
fixed automatically by relatively easily determinable features of  the context. Demonstratives, on the other
hand, are thought to require some supplementation in order to refer. Although I will later make use of  this
distinction, for the most part I will follow Kaplan (1989) and use the term 'demonstratives' to cover both
demonstratives and indexicals.
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1) How can demonstratives refer to different things on different uses?
2) If  a demonstrative can refer to different things on different uses, then how can it have an
unambiguous meaning?
3) How does the stable, unambiguous meaning of  a demonstrative determine what the
demonstrative refers to on different uses?
The received semantic theory of  demonstratives, proposed by Kaplan (1989), does exactly
this. Kaplan distinguishes between two semantic levels – character and content. The content
of  a demonstrative is what it refers to in a context. The context is a sequence of  parameters
like a time, place, agent and possible world. The character is what determines the content of
the demonstrative in the context. According to Kaplan, character is a function that takes as
input a context and yields as output a content. For example, Kaplan (1989: 505) proposes that
the character of  'I' takes as input the context in which it is uttered and gives as output the
agent of  the context. Character can also be identified with linguistic meaning, which is what
competent speakers of  a language grasp in virtue of  their competence and use to
communicate contents. Kaplan's account has many virtues – it is compact, yet has great
explanatory power. At the same time, this theory in its simplicity does not have the tools for
dealing with all the data that it should be able to deal with.
The kind of  data I have in mind are the intuitions of  competent language users. Any semantic
theory for a natural language should conform to the intuitions of  the competent speakers of
that language.2 A semantic theory conforms to the speakers' intuitions if  the predictions that it
would make about the semantic properties of  expressions in specific cases of  language use are
in accordance with the intuitions that speakers have about the semantic properties of  those
expressions in those cases. The basis of  this methodological requirement is the assumption
that what constitutes a speaker's linguistic ability is her implicit knowledge about the semantics
of  the language. Cases of  language use function as test-cases for semantic theories. Cases can
be used to evaluate theories for correctness and to compare them to one another. If  there is a
theory whose predictions about the semantic properties of  expressions conform to speakers'
intuitions about the semantic properties of  those expressions in a wide range of  cases, then
2 Sometimes a case can be made that speaker's intuitions track the pragmatic rather than semantic features of
language. In that case, something should be said about what distinguishes these purportedly pragmatic
features from genuinely semantic features. Intuitions should not be left aside just because they do not fit the
theory under consideration.
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that strongly indicates that the theory is more or less correct.
Kaplan's theory faces challenges from cases where it is unable to make predictions which
conform to the intuitions of  competent language users. In order to explain why one would
favour the kind of  theory that I will be defending in my thesis, I will introduce the distinction
between indexicals and true demonstratives.3 So, firstly, there are indexicals such as 'I', 'here',
'now', 'today', 'tomorrow'. Their referents are fixed automatically, given the context of  the
utterance, which, as specified earlier, includes the agent, location, time and possible world. For
example, 'today' will pick out the day of  the utterance as the referent, and the referent of  'I' is
the agent in the context. To say that the referents of  pure indexicals are fixed automatically is
to say that the meaning of  the indexical is sufficient to pick out a referent to pick out a
determinate content, given a context. As Kaplan (1989: 491) puts it, “No supplementary
actions or intentions are needed.” Not only is the character of  a pure indexical sufficient for
determining a referent, the referent of  a pure indexical cannot be defeated by any associated
demonstration or speaker intention. For example, when someone uses the expression 'I' while
pointing to somebody else or intending to use 'I' to refer to that person, 'I' will still refer to the
person who is using it. 
Secondly, there are true demonstratives, of  which the most paradigmatic examples are 'this'
and 'that', but also 'he', 'she', 'it', etc. These are expressions which require something additional
to fix the referent, since the meaning of  the expression is not sufficient for automatically
picking out a referent, given the time, place and agent of  the utterance. It seems that for true
demonstratives, a mere demonstration can fix what the referent of  a demonstrative is in a
context, even if  the speaker does not wish to refer to the thing that ends up as the referent. It
might seem at first glance that the reference-fixing feature of  demonstratives just could be an
accompanying demonstration, such as a finger-pointing or a nod. But on further consideration
this proposal looks implausible, since demonstrations can successfully refer without any
accompanying demonstration. In addition to demonstrations being dispensable for successful
reference, it is a problem that demonstrations are inherently indeterminate. Demonstrations
never single out just one thing. As Kaplan says,
[...]whenever I point at something, from the surveyor's point of  view I point at many
things. When I point at my son (and say 'I love [that]'), I may also be pointing at a book
he is holding, his jacket, a button on his jacket, his skin, his heart, and his dog standing
3 Although the distinction has been called into question (for example by Mount, 2008), I will assume for the
purposes of  making clear which theories aim to account for which expressions that there is a distinction. 
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behind him[...] (1978: 396)
Now that I have introduced the distinction between indexicals and true demonstratives, I can
be more clear about the scope of  the thesis. Kaplan's theory is challenged by both cases in
which indexicals and cases in which true demonstratives are used. Whereas some
modifications of  Kaplan's theory, such as Cohen (2013), Corazza et al. (2002), Gorvett (2005),
Michelson (2014), Sidelle (1991), etc., have only been concerned with giving correct
predictions in cases which involve the use of  indexicals, there is a group of  theories which
have the means to account for uses of  both indexicals and true demonstratives. Such theories
have been called doxastic control theories, since according to them, the content of  a
demonstrative is fixed by a mechanism which involves the mental states of  the conversational
participants. If  doxastic control theories can adequately deal with most cases of
demonstratives, including both indexicals and true demonstratives, then in virtue of  having
greater explanatory power, they are preferable to theories that cannot deal with true
demonstratives. Doxastic control theories can be broadly divided into two – the speaker-
control theory and the audience-control theory. According to the speaker-control theory, the
content of  a demonstrative in a context is fixed by the speaker's intention. A bit more
formally:
The Speaker-Control Theory
The content of  a demonstrative d is x in context c iff  the speaker of  c would intend d to
refer to x.
For example, if  someone uses the sentence 'this is smaller than this,' the contents of  'this' in
the context will be fixed by the referential intentions that accompany each occurrence of  'this'
in the sentence. This theory has gained widespread support and is the main rival of  the
audience-control theory. Compared to the speaker-control theory, the audience-control theory
has received little attention. Since the purpose of  this thesis is to defend the audience-control
theory against counterarguments, and a more thorough discussion of  the speaker-control
theory is not required for this purpose, I will not be spending any more time focusing solely
on the speaker-control theory. Instead, I will go on to introduce the audience-control theory.
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2 The Audience-Control Theory
In this section, I will present the audience-control theory and provide some reasons in favour
of  it. According to the audience-control theory, a demonstrative refers to what an audience
would reasonably take it to refer to. Attentiveness and linguistic competence is required of  the
relevant audience. The audience-control theory differs from the demonstration theory of
reference and the speaker-control theory in that according to it, there is no single thing which
fixes the referent of  the demonstrative in all contexts. Rather, in different contexts, the
referent will be fixed by different features of  the context. But what is common to those
features is that they determine the referent because it is reasonable for an audience member to
take those features as evidence of  what the speaker is intending to refer to. This means that
the account allows for the speaker to be creative when using demonstratives so long as the
audience is in a position to grasp the referent. The audience-control theory has been defended
by Wettstein (1984) and Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2004).
These authors have formulated the theory in different ways: 
The Audience-Control Theory (Wettstein)
The content of  a demonstrative D is x in context c iff  a competent and attentive
audience A would identify x as the content of  D in c on the basis of  cues that A would
reasonably take the speaker of  c to be exploiting. (Wettstein 1984: 73)
The Audience-Control Theory for Indexicals (Romdenh-Romluc)
The content of  an indexical I is fixed relative to a context c iff  the attentive and
competent audience A would identify c as the context relative to which the content of  I
is fixed on the basis of  cues A would reasonably take the speaker to be exploiting.
(Romdenh-Romluc 2002: 39)
While Romdenh-Romluc's formulation only concerns indexicals, Wettstein's formulation
allows us to account for all demonstratives, including true demonstratives, because instead of
specifying how the content-fixing context is picked out, the latter specifies how the content
itself  is picked out. As I explained in the first section, since the content of  a demonstrative is
not automatically fixed in a context, in order to fix the content of  a true demonstrative, it does
not suffice to merely fix relative to which context it has a content.
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Ultimately, it seems that there is no reason to prefer a separate formulation of  the audience-
control theory for pure indexicals. In order to see this, let's look at the formulation provided
by Romdenh-Romluc. According to it, the context fixed by a reasonable audience will fix the
referent of  the indexical. If  the indexical refers to anything relative to that context, then there
is a unique thing that it refers to. This means that in cases where an indexical refers, if  a
reasonable audience member fixes the context, they simultaneously fix the unique referent. So
it makes no difference to what the audience-control theory would predict about indexicals
whether we conceive of  the audience as context-fixing or content-fixing. Since conceiving of
the audience-control theory as a theory which explains how content is fixed allows for us to
give a unified account of  true demonstratives and indexicals, I will take the formulation
provided by Wettstein to be better for the purposes of  the thesis. In the following, I will use
the name 'the audience-control theory' to refer to the thesis under the formulation provided
by Wettstein.
Having stated the theory, we can see what motivates it. Why should we think that
demonstratives refer by this kind of  a mechanism? There are general theoretic reasons to
favour the audience-control theory, as well as some concrete cases where demonstratives are
used which support the theory. It has been argued that reference has to be determined by
publicly accessible things (Gauker 2008). Since speakers' intentions are not publicly accessible,
intentions cannot determine content. Supposedly, since the content of  an expression has to be
available to all conversational participants, what determines content has to be available to
them, too. Why should it be accepted that semantic content is public? 
Firstly, it seems that if  it weren't and the contents of  utterances were systematically unavailable
to the interlocutors, then communication would systematically fail. But communication is
often successful. This would be explained by the fact that contents are available to everyone
participating in the conversation. Secondly, there is the following argument, which has been
defended by Recanati (2004). Hearers are able to infer what is merely implied from what is,
strictly speaking, said. 'What is said' is the content of  an uttered sentence. Now, plausibly, this
kind of  inference is only possible if  hearers have access to the content of  the utterance. It
follows that semantic content must be available to the audience. But why do the determiners
of  content in addition to the contents themselves have to be available to audiences as well as
speakers? Since the determiners of  content are what aids audience members in figuring out
what the content is in a context, the determiners of  content should be public features of  the
context. If  audiences do not have access to what determines content, they are not able to
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figure out what the content is. The fact that audience-control theory satisfies the requirement
of  accessibility motivates the theory.
In addition to satisfying this general requirement, the audience-control view is supported by
cases in which the intuitive referent of  a demonstrative corresponds to something that the
audience reasonably takes the demonstrative to refer to, and not to what the speaker intends to
refer to or what is demonstrated. I will consider two examples. Here is the first example,
introduced by Romdenh-Romluc. 
RE-ENACTMENT
Fernando is taking part in a re-enactment of  the Norman Conquest. The re-enactment
is to be staged in a manor house. Fernando is to play the part of  Harold's messenger,
who announces to the King that the French are invading England. At the appointed
time, Fernando bursts into the main hall and announces to the assembled guests, 
'Now the French are invading England!'
However, Fernando has confused the date of  the re-enactment. He has arrived a week
early and made his announcement to wedding guests who are staying at the manor, not
other people involved in the re-enactment of  the Norman Conquest. (Romdenh-Romluc
2002: 37)
In the example, Fernando intends to refer to 1066, which is when the Norman Conquest took
place. But the audience members, if  they are competent in English, pay attention to the
utterance, and are generally reasonable people, take him to refer to the time of  the wedding.
Intuitively 'now' refers to the time of  the wedding rather than to the year 1066. We can
without controversy presume that the audience is attentive and competent in English. So the
intuitive referent 'now' conforms to what a competent and attentive audience would take to be
the referent of  'now'.
Let's look at the second example. Kaplan (1978: 240) has devised the following case:
CARNAP/AGNEW
Suppose that without turning and looking I point to the place on my wall which has long
been occupied by a picture of  Rudolf  Carnap and I say, 'That is a picture of  one of  the
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greatest philosophers of  the twentieth century.' But unbeknownst to me, someone has
replaced my picture of  Carnap with one of  Spiro Agnew. […] I have said of  a picture of
Spiro Agnew that it pictures one of  the greatest philosophers of  the twentieth century.
And my speech and demonstration suggest no other natural interpretation [...] No
matter how hard I intend Carnap’s picture, I do not think it reasonable to call the
content of  my utterance true.
Kaplan intends to refer to the picture of  Carnap, but intuitively 'that' refers to the picture of
Agnew. The audience-control theory can explain why this is so. It is reasonable for the person
whom Kaplan is addressing in the example to think that Kaplan intends to refer to the picture
of  Agnew, given that Kaplan points to the picture of  Agnew and says that it's a picture, and
the speaker does not know that there was another picture on the wall before nor knows who
Agnew is.
There is a potential problem with the audience-control theory. One might think that if
contents of  demonstratives are fixed by what the audience can reasonably take the speaker to
say, then speakers do not have control over what they say. But this is not what the audience-
control theory implies. Since according to this theory, a semantic content relative to an
interpreter is determined by somebody who bases their interpretation firmly on cues which
the speaker could employ, the speaker does have control over what they say. The speaker can
choose which expressions to use, she can use gestures and external objects to help get her
intended content across to her audience. It is true that the audience-control theory gives the
speaker much more responsibility in communication than the speaker-control theory. The
speaker needs to do enough if  she wants to be understood correctly. But this seems to be in
accordance with what is required from actual speakers. Mere intentions to refer to things are
not sufficient for successful communication in actual communication situations. If  the
interpreter has a role in determining what the semantic content of  an expression is in a
context, then that would explain why speakers have to do more than merely intend to express
their intended contents to others. Thus, the observations that on the audience-control theory,
speakers do not always have full control over what they say, and that what they can say is
restricted by what the audience can understand is not a weakness. Rather, it is a strength of  the
audience-control theory.
Although the audience-control theory is able to explain speakers' intuitions in cases where the
speaker-control theory is not, the audience-control theory has been far less popular than the
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speaker-control theory and the proponents of  the audience-control theory have failed to
provide any responses to arguments which have been presented against it. For this reason, as
things currently stand, the audience-control theory looks defeated. In the next two sections, I
will provide an overview of  the arguments which have been presented against the audience-
control theory. Altogether, there are five counterarguments. In the third section, I will present
the first three counterarguments and respond to them. In the fourth section, I will provide
two ways of  specifying what predictions the audience-control theory would make in certain
problem cases, so that the remaining two counterarguments can be responded to as well.
14
3 Counterarguments to the Audience-Control Theory
In this section, I will consider three counterarguments to the audience-control theory. These
arguments can be responded to within the framework of  the audience-control theory as it has
already been introduced.
3.1 The Dispensability of  Audience
According to the first counterargument, an audience is completely unnecessary for successful
reference. Predelli (2002: 312) argues that an utterance does not need to have an audience in
order for a demonstrative to refer. Let's take the Re-enactment case as an example. Someone
can utter 'Now England is being invaded' to herself  while thinking about the Norman
Conquest without the presence of  anyone else. Intuitively, the lack of  audience does not stop
her from referring to what she does. The speaker will then have referred to 1066, even though
nobody is overhearing him. The problem here is that while intuitively 'now' does refer, the
audience-control theory would predict reference-failure because there is no audience. If  there
is no audience, there is nobody to take the demonstrative to refer to anything. So the audience-
control view gives an incorrect prediction.
However, this is really not a problem that the audience-control view cannot handle. Predelli's
argument is based on the assumption that the speaker and audience are always distinct. But
this is not an assumption that the audience-control theory needs to rely on. A natural response
would be that in cases where the speaker is talking to herself, the speaker and the audience are
identical. Before the utterance takes place, the speaker is probably narrating the story of  the
Norman Conquest in her inner speech. The utterance is part of  this discourse for the speaker.
So it is reasonable for her to take 'here' to refer to the time of  the Norman Conquest. The
present moment does not have any role in the discourse. Since in the described case, the
audience, being identical to the speaker, would reasonably take herself  to refer to 1066, the
content of  'now' relative to her context is 1066. It would be unreasonable for her to take
herself  to refer to the present moment, given the broader context of  her utterance. This
prediction agrees with the intuition that 'now' refers to 1066. Therefore, the audience-control
theory does not falsely predict that demonstratives fail to refer when they are used in
situations where there is nobody present besides the speaker.
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3.2 The Argument from Reliance on Conventions
The second counterargument for the audience-control theory is based on the observation that
audiences sometimes seem to rely on conventions when they judge what the content of  a
demonstrative on a particular usage event is. Predelli (2002: 312) argues that the audience-
control theory cannot specify what the competence of  the hearer amounts to without
appealing to them being familiar with conventions. Hence, the audience-control theory
reduces to conventionalism about demonstratives. Since according to him, the conventionalist
account of  demonstratives is unsatisfying, the audience-control theory is also unsatisfying. 
In order to present Predelli's argument, I will first introduce the answering machine puzzle,
because the argument depends on the way that Romdenh-Romluc explains the way the
audience makes judgments about semantic content in answering machine cases. Consider the
following sentence:
(1) I am not here now
According to the analysis that Kaplan (1989) proposed of  'I', 'here' and 'now': 
(i) 'I' refers to the agent of  the context of  utterance;
(ii) 'here' refers to the place of  the context of  utterance;
(iii) 'now' refers to the time of  the context of  utterance.
'I am here now' as uttered in a context is true if  and only if  the agent who produces the
utterance is at the place of  the utterance at the time of  the utterance. Since the agent of  the
utterance is always at the place of  the utterance at the time of  the utterance, 'I am here now'
will be true in every context. It follows that the negation of  'I am not here now', i.e. (1) is false
in every context. But there are cases where it seems that (1) is uttered truthfully. When we hear
a recorded message of  (1) on a phone, it does seem to be true. In order for a theory to make
the prediction that (1) is truthfully uttered in answering machine cases, the theory has to
predict that the content of  (1) in those cases is that the owner of  the line is not in the location
of  the phone at the time of  the call. Kaplan's theory makes an incorrect prediction for the
content of  (1) in answering machine cases.
Having presented the answering machine puzzle, we can move on to Predelli's argument. Let's
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imagine a scenario where a caller takes 'now' in (1) to refer to some time before the call rather
than to the time of  the call. If  the audience-control theory is to make the correct prediction
that 'now' refers to the time of  the call, then it has to rule out the possibility that such a caller
counts as a competent audience. It seems that in order to disqualify this caller from being
competent, a proponent of  the audience-control theory should say that an audience member
is competent only if  they are familiar with how answering machines work. Regarding
demonstratives, knowing how answering machines work amounts to being familiar with the
conventions governing the use of  demonstratives in answering machine cases. Romdenh-
Romluc seems to agree with this statement in the following passage: “the caller will take [the
speaker] to be exploiting the convention that an answering machine message refers to the time
when I is heard by the caller” (Romdenh-Romluc 2002: 39). Since a competent audience, who
fixes the content of  a demonstrative, must have the reaction prescribed by the convention
when a demonstrative is used, it seems that the convention screens off  audience's reactions
from doing any real reference-fixing. The convention rather than the audience fixes the
referent.
Based on this observation, Predelli claims that the audience-control theory is a version of  the
conventionalist theory, according to which the content of  a demonstrative is fixed by the
conventions that are associated with the different types of  contexts. The problem with this
kind of  a view is that it is implausible that there are conventions regulating all settings where
one can successfully use demonstratives. On different communication channels
demonstratives refer differently. If  this is the case, then there must be different conventions
governing the use of  demonstratives on those communication channels. Predelli thinks that
this is unlikely.
Now, I will respond to Predelli's argument. Predelli takes the answering machine puzzle to
show that an audience must always rely on conventions to reasonably make a judgment about
the content of  the demonstrative. However, one example case is not enough to motivate this
universal conclusion. Even if  there is a convention which governs the use of  answering
machines and enables hearers to figure out what the unique content of  utterances of  (1) is in
answering machine cases, that does not mean that for any setting, there must be a convention
in place for the hearer to take demonstratives to refer to things. Since the audience both can
and must rely on other features of  the speech situation in order to make a judgment about
what the content of  a demonstrative is on a particular use, the audience-control theory does
not reduce to conventionalism.
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Let me explain first why the audience must rely on other things besides conventions and then
explain what these features are. The conventional aspects of  semantics of  demonstratives
underdetermine reference. The conventional features of  demonstratives that I have in mind
are constraints on what demonstratives can be used or reasonably taken to refer to.4
Constraints on reference differ for different demonstratives. For example, the 'we' will refer to
more than one individual because the expression 'we' linguistically encodes that its reference in
a context includes more than one individual. But clearly, this kind of  a conventional feature of
the expression 'we' is not sufficiently determinate. It does not suffice to fix a content, given a
context. But a competent language user will be guided by these constraints. This kind of
proposal enables us to weaken the competence required of  an audience. We can say that a
language user is competent with demonstratives if  they know how to use demonstratives in a
way that satisfies these kinds of  constraints.
The assumption that the conventional features associated with demonstratives are not
sufficiently determinate to fix a content relative to a context is evident when it comes to true
demonstratives. Utterances which include multiple occurrences of  the same true
demonstrative show this. For example, we can truthfully say about two objects 'That's taller
than that'. For the sentence to come out as true in a context, the two occurrences of  'that'
have to have different contents. Hence, whatever is the referential constraint associated with
'that'5, it does not suffice to fix a unique referent relative to a context.6 It seems that the
conventions associated with indexicals are not always sufficiently determinate to pick out a
referent either. If  there is a convention governing the use of  'now' on a type of
communication device, then it must establish which time 'now' refers to any time it is used on
that device. It should either always refer to the time when the message is produced or always
refer to the time that the message is read or heard. However, as Gidwani (2017) has argued,
the use of  indexicals does not display that kind of  regularity on at least certain kinds of
communication channels – for example, on postcards, the internet and video. Sometimes,
'now' on these channels refers to the time of  the production, and sometimes to the decoding
of  the message.
4 For example, François Recanati (2001) talks about these kinds of  constraints on reference for
demonstratives.
5 The referential constraint cannot be that the referent must be demonstrated by the speaker, for reasons given
in section one.
6 One view that would avoid this conclusion is the view that the context changes with each occurrence of
'that'. This kind of  a theory has been proposed by David Braun (1996).
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So, it seems that Predelli is correct to point out that conventions do not suffice to fix what
demonstratives refer to. But this is not a strong blow against the audience-control theory.
Although the content-fixing audience must be familiar with the conventional features of
demonstratives, it is them rather than the conventions that fix the contents of  demonstratives.
Since the audience can rely on other features of  the speech situation besides conventions,
there is work to be done by audiences in fixing the contents of  demonstratives. So what kinds
of  other features of  the speech situation can the audience rely on to make a judgment about
what a demonstrative refers to?
Since speakers can use a wide array of  different tools to reveal what they intend to refer to, the
audience can take this creativity into account. Speakers can use the constraints that are
associated with at least some demonstratives, other sentences in the discourse, sub-sentential
expressions, head-nods, pointings, the prominence of  objects, previous conversations, objects
in some way related to the intended referent, etc., to make it clear what they intend to refer to
when they use a demonstrative. The audience members make a judgment, given available
evidence about what the speaker intends to refer to.
3.3 The Undermotivation Argument
Thirdly, Cohen and Michaelson (2013: 586) have the worry that the audience-control theory is
undermotivated by the example cases of  the audience-control theory. The main point is that
the cases do not favour the audience-control theory over the speaker-control theory, since the
predictions that both theories make about the cases are equally good. The cases that theories
of  demonstratives aim to explain can be broadly divided into two groups. Firstly, there are
cases where the audience successfully grasps the referent that is intended by the speaker.
Secondly, there are cases where the intended referent and the so called public referent diverge.
The latter sort of  cases are called cases of  mismatch. Since the undermotivation problem is
different for the success and mismatch cases reason, I will handle the problem in two separate
subsections.
3.3.1 Cases of  Successful Communication
Cases, where what a speaker intends to refer to and what the audience takes her to refer to
coincide, are equally well explained by the speaker-control theory and the audience-control
theory. The theories make identical predictions for these cases. An example of  this is a
standard answering machine case, where a caller hears an utterance of  (1), and takes it to say
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that the owner of  the line is not at the location of  the phone at the time of  the call. This is the
intuitive content of  (1) in answering machine cases and both the audience-control theory and
the speaker-control theory make predictions conforming to our intuition. Cohen and
Michaelson argue that because of  this, the case fails to motivate the audience-control theory.
It is correct to point out that cases of  successful communication by themselves are not
sufficient to show that the audience-control theory is better than the speaker-control theory.
However, this should not surprise a proponent of  the audience-control theory. After all, the
answering machine case is not presented by Romdenh-Romluc as one that would motivate the
audience-control theory over the speaker-control theory. Rather, the case works as a test-case
which an adequate theory of  demonstratives should be able to account for. It is in itself  not a
problem for the audience-control theory that other theories can also account for the case. The
fact that the audience-control theory makes a prediction about the content of  (1) which
corresponds to the intuitive content of  (1) in answering machine cases does in no way
undermine the audience-control theory. 
3.3.2 Cases of  Mismatch
In mismatch cases, which I will describe in a moment, the predictions which the audience-
control theory makes differ from those that the speaker-control theory makes. It seems that
the intuitive referent in those cases coincides with the prediction that the audience-control
theory makes. The re-enactment case is one such case. Since the audience-control theory
makes a better prediction than the speaker-control theory, the case should motivate the
audience-control theory over the speaker-control theory. However, Cohen and Michaelson
(2013: 586) argue, it is problematic that this advantage of  the audience-control theory depends
on the strategy of  using idealized audiences rather than actual audiences. According to the
audience-control theory, in cases where the actual audience is incompetent, inattentive or
unreasonable, the referent is not fixed relative to that audience, but relative to an idealized
audience that is identical in other respects.
Cohen and Michaelson argue that if  this is a legitimate strategy for the audience-control
theory, then it should be a permissible strategy for the speaker-control theory as well. If  the
audience-control theory can appeal to idealization in order to make correct prediction in cases
of  mismatch, then the speaker-control theory could appeal to idealized speakers to make the
same prediction. So, in cases of  mismatch, the speaker-control theory would get the correct
prediction relative to an idealized speaker. To my knowledge, no proponent of  the speaker-
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control theory has adopted this kind of  a view, and Cohen and Michaelson do not spell it out.
Nevertheless, let's see what such an appeal to an idealized speaker look like. I will use a
mismatch example from Christopher Gauker (2008) to illustrate.
TIE
Harry and Sally are at a department store and Harry is trying on ties. Harry has wrapped
a garish pink-and-green tie around his neck and is looking at himself  in a mirror. Sally is
standing next to the mirror gazing toward the tie around Harry’s neck and says, 'That
matches your new jacket.' As a matter of  fact, Sally has been contemplating in thought
the tie that Harry tried on two ties back. At first she thought she did not like it, but then
it occurred to her that it would look good with Harry’s new jacket. We can even suppose
that in saying 'that' what she intended to refer to was the tie two ties back. But under the
circumstances, Harry is in no position to realize that the tie she intended to refer to was
the tie two ties back and therefore is in no position to take Sally’s intention into account
in identifying the reference of  her demonstrative 'that'. The only thing one could
reasonably expect Sally’s demonstrative 'that' to refer to is the pink-and-green tie around
Harry’s neck. (Gauker 2008: 363)
Let's assume for the moment that as a matter of  fact, 'that' refers to the tie around Harry's
neck. The regular speaker-control theory would give the incorrect prediction that 'that' refers
to the tie two ties back. The idealized speaker-control theory should predict that it refers to
the tie that Harry is wearing. This theory should state that the referent of  a demonstrative in a
context is fixed by what a competent, attentive and reasonable speaker would intend to refer
to by the demonstrative in that context. This is an intriguing proposal. This means that in
cases where there is a mismatch between what the speaker intends to say and what the
audience takes the speaker to say, the audience-control theory and the speaker-control theory
offer equally good explanations. Indeed, there would be no mismatch.
However, it seems that the idealization strategy is not available for the proponent of  the
speaker-control theory. This is because there seems that there is no audience-independent way
to determine what the idealized speaker would intend. An idealized speaker would intend to
refer to precisely the thing that external cues point to from the perspective of  an audience
member. So it seems that the idealized speaker-control theory would collapse into the
audience-control theory while the contrary is not true.
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4 Challenges from Problem Cases
In this section, I will present two more arguments against the audience-control theory.
According to the first of  these arguments, the way that the audience-control theory is set up
by Wettstein and Romdenh-Romluc leaves it unclear what kinds of  predictions it would make
in specific cases outside the ones described by Wettstein and Romdenh-Romluc. This suggests
that the audience-control theory fails to make a prediction about the content of  the
demonstrative in cases where there is more than one thing that the audience members can
reasonably take to be the content of  a demonstrative. According to the second argument, the
audience-control theory cannot be used to explain cases wherein demonstratives are used to
mislead the audience.
4.1 The Underspecification Problem
Cohen and Michaelson (2013: 586) have argued that the restrictions, which the proponents of
the audience-control theory place on audiences relative to which the content of  a
demonstrative is fixed, are not sufficiently restrictive to single out a unique content. The
audience-control theory requires that the referent be one that is identified by an attentive and
competent audience based on cues that the speaker can be reasonably taken to exploit.
However, insofar as people can have different background beliefs, perceptual capabilities and
perspectives on a situation, the cues that they can reasonably take the speaker to exploit can
differ from person to person. And differences in beliefs, perceptual capabilities and
perspectives do not necessarily render one person less attentive, linguistically competent or
reasonable than another. Therefore it is entirely possible that there is more than one thing that
the attentive and competent members of  an audience can reasonably take to be the content on
the basis of  the cues that they can take the speaker to be exploiting.
Because the audience-control theory does not specify how to identify a single audience relative
to whom the referent of  a demonstrative is fixed, it is unclear exactly what kinds of
predictions the audience-control view would make about the referents of  demonstratives in
particular cases outside the ones described in Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2004) and Wettstein
(1984). The success of  the audience-control theory depends on the specific description of
cases like the Re-enactment case and the Carnap/Agnew case. The distinctive feature of  these
cases is that there is consensus between all the attentive, competent and reasonable members
of  the audience about what the demonstratives in the cases refer to. To see this, we can make
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slight changes to the cases and see what the audience-control theory would predict.
First, let's return to the re-enactment case and make a slight adjustment to the audience in the
case. Let's suppose that a part of  the audience knows that there will be a re-enactment of  the
Norman Conquest and that Fernando is playing the part of  the messenger. The other
audience members will be unaware of  the re-enactment just as before. When Fernando bursts
in the door and yells, 'Now the French are invading England,' the members of  the audience
aware of  the re-enactment will most likely realize what is going on. They will take 'now' to
refer to the time that is being re-enacted, 1066, and not to the time of  the wedding. But the
members of  the audience who are unaware of  the re-enactment will reasonably take 'now' to
refer to the time of  the wedding. Since Romdenh-Romluc assumes that there is only one
semantic content associated with one use of  'now', it is not clear what kind of  a prediction
they would make for this case. Both of  the groups in the audience can be assumed to be
attentive, competent and making a reasonable judgment based on the evidence that is available
to them. There is no basis for claiming that only one of  them is the audience relative to whose
context the demonstrative has its semantic content.
4.2 Misleading Demonstratives
In this subsection, I will describe the counterargument that Brian Weatherson (2002) has
presented against the audience-control view. Weatherson's concern is that the audience control
theory makes incorrect predictions in cases where the speaker is misleading the audience about
what is said. According to the audience-control view, whatever the audience would take to be
the content of  the demonstrative in a given context just is its content in that context. Because
of  this, the audience-control view entails that it is not possible to mislead a reasonable
audience about what the content of  a demonstrative is. However, there are examples where
the audience seems to be mistaken about what the content of  a demonstrative is on a given
use. The following two cases are provided by Weatherson to support this intuition.
PRANK
Imagine that at my University the email servers are down, so all communication from
the office staff  is written notes left in our mailboxes. I notice that one of  my colleagues,
Bruce, has a rather full mailbox, and hence must not have been checking his messages
for the last day or two. I also know that Bruce is a forgetful type, and if  someone told
him that he’d forgotten about a faculty meeting yesterday, he’d probably believe them. In
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fact he hasn’t forgotten; the meeting is for later today. So I decide to play a little trick on
him. I write an official looking note saying 'There is a faculty meeting today', leave it
undated, and put it in Bruce’s mailbox underneath several other messages, so it looks like
it has been there for a day or two. When Bruce sees it he is appropriately tricked, and for
an instant panics about the meeting that he has missed. 
LIE
Jack leaves the following message on Jill’s answering machine late one Saturday night. 'Hi
Jill, it’s Jack. I’m at Rick’s. This place is wild. There’s lots of  cute girls here, but I’m just
thinking about you. See you soon.' In the background loud music is playing, as if  Jack
were at a nightclub, indeed as if  Jack were at Rick’s, so Jill reasonably concludes that Jack
was at Rick’s when he sent the message, and hence that “here” refers to Rick’s. In fact
Jack was home alone, but wanted to hide this fact, so he turned the stereo up to full
volume while leaving the message. Despite the fact that a reasonable and attentive
member of  the target audience inferred on the basis of  contextual clues left by Jack that
the context was Rick’s, it was not. The context was Jack’s house, and “here” in Jack’s
message referred to his house.
Weatherson's position is that the intuitive referents of  demonstratives in these cases are not
the ones identified by the audience as referents. In the Prank case, 'today' on the note seems to
refer to the day on which it is written and read. So Weatherson, who writes the message,
manages to write down a true statement when he writes 'There is a faculty meeting today'. But
Bruce takes him to refer to some previous day and saying something false. In the Lie case,
according to Weatherson, the intuitive referent for 'here' is Jack's house. When Jack says
'There’s lots of  cute girls here', he is saying something false, since there are no girls in his
house. Since Jill would take 'here' to refer to Rick's house, what she takes him to say could very
well be true. So, prima facie it seems that what a competent and attentive audience member
would reasonably take the speaker to refer to is not what is referred to.
Let's consider both of  these cases more carefully. Should we accept that the demonstratives in
the cases refer to what Weatherson thinks they do? The proposal was that in the prank case,
'today' refers to the day on which Weatherson writes the note and puts it in the pigeonhole.
However, it is not clear that it does. In order to successfully communicate using a slip and a
pigeonhole, the slips ought to have dates on them or there should be a system for posting slips
and emptying the pigeonhole. Otherwise the people who read the notes would hardly know
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what to make of  the notes. If  the slip has a date on it then 'today' would intuitively refer to the
date on the slip, rather than the date that the message is written, unless the date on the slip is
the same as the date on which the message is written. But if  there were a date on the slip, then
Bruce could not be reasonably mistaken about what 'today' refers to. The case could work only
if  we assume that the slip is undated. If  the slip is undated, then 'today' can have a
determinate referent only if  the pigeonholes are emptied daily. But, if  Bruce did follow that
custom, then he could not, again, be mistaken about what 'today' refers to.
There is a more important thing to consider about this case. There are two times that the not
is read. First, Weatherson reads it while he writes it. He will reasonably take 'today' on the note
to refer to the day on which he is writing the note and the faculty meeting takes place.
Secondly, Bruce reads the note. When he reads it, there is no day that he can reasonably take
'today' to refer to. Since written notes can be read several times, different people can
reasonably have different interpretations of  the content of  the message. It is not as clear as
Weatherson presents it to be that 'today' on the note will always refer to the day on which the
message is written.
In the case where Jack tells Jill that he is at Rick's, Weatherson claims that 'here' refers to Jack's
place. If  we look at what exactly Jack says, then this claim starts to look suspicious. He says,
“Hi Jill, it’s Jack. I’m at Rick’s. This place is wild. There’s lots of  cute girls here.” First, Jack
tells Jill that he is at Rick's house. It seems that in this sequence of  sentences, 'here' and 'this
place' both refer anaphorically to Rick's house rather than to Jack's house. If  this is so, then Jill
is not misled about what 'here' refers to. Then the case does not show that the audience can be
misled about what the content of  a demonstrative is. However, it is open to Weatherson to
change the example so that his conclusion seems more plausible. Suppose that Jill already
expects Jack to be at Rick's house. Jack calls Jill and says, 'Hey, Jill, this place is wild, there are
lots of  cute girls here.' In this case, Jack does not mention Rick's place and it is more plausible
that 'here' refers to his actual location.
But even in this case it seems doubtful that 'here' will determinately refer to Jack's house. This
is evident if  we consider what the interlocutors in the case would report as having been said.
Imagine the conversation between Jill, Rick, and Jack.
Jill: Hey, Rick! How was your party? Jack told me that he met some nice girls at your
house.
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Rick: Well, he must have lied to you, because he was not at my party. As a matter of  fact
I know that he spent the entire night at home playing video games.
Jack: I never said I was at Rick's house!
Is Jill or Jack correct about what was Jack said? I do not think that there is one correct answer
to this question. It seems incorrect to simply say that the content of  Jack's utterance was that
there are girls at his home. This proposal works only if  we already assume that any time 'here'
is used, it refers to the location of  the speaker. It seems just as, if  not more, plausible that
what Jack said was that there were girls at Rick's party. Therefore, what 'here' refers to is
indeterminate or refers to different things relative to Jill and Jack. 
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5 Responses
In this section, I will propose two different replies that a proponent of  the audience-control
theory can give to the argument from misleading and the argument from underspecification.
These arguments relied on there being cases where either there is a disagreement between
what the audience and the speaker can reasonably take as the referent of  the demonstrative or
between what different members of  the audience can reasonably take to be the referent. I will
argue that if  there are such cases of  disagreement, then these do not show that the audience-
control theory is incorrect. There are two ways in which the audience-control theory can
accommodate cases of  referential disagreement. The proponents of  the audience-control
theory can either respond that in these cases it is indeterminate what the demonstrative refers
to or respond that a demonstrative can refer to different things relative to different people.  In
the end of  the section, I will assess these two responses.
Before moving on to the responses, I will make a slight change to who counts as the audience
on the audience-control theory. This will be necessary to respond to these counterarguments.
Both Romdenh-Romluc and Wettstein think that the audience relative to whom the content of
a demonstrative is fixes must be the “individual who it is reasonable to take the speaker to be
addressing” (Wettstein 1984: 74). I do not think that this restriction is essential to their theory,
and will work with a looser notion of  an audience. There is no good reason to restrict the
audiences to just those that are addressed by the speaker. Often, it is unclear whom the
speaker is addressing and often there is nobody in particular who the speaker intends to
address. In the thesis, audience will be anyone who is part of  the conversation. So any
conversational participant who is attentive and competent counts as part of  the audience. This
can include the speaker herself, since when the speaker is making an utterance, she herself  is a
participant in the conversation. If  she makes an utterance, she hears or reads it while making
it.
5.1 The Indeterminacy Response
According to the first response, in cases of  referential disagreement, it is indeterminate what
the demonstrative refers to. Let's see how this proposal would work. In the revised version of
the re-enactment case, a part of  the audience reasonably takes 'now' to refer to the time of  the
wedding, and the other part of  the audience takes 'now' to refer to 1066. Which time does
'now' semantically refer to? According to the indeterminacy response, in this kind of  a case,
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the audience-control theory predicts that it is indeterminate which time 'now' refers to.
Next, I will consider how this response handles the argument from underspecification and the
argument from cases of  misleading. According to the argument from underspecification, the
audience-control theory is not a good theory, because it fails to make a clear prediction in
cases where there are several things that different attentive and competent conversational
participants can reasonably take to be the content of  the demonstrative. According to the
indeterminacy response, in these situations, the demonstrative does not have a determinate
content. So according to this response, either there is only one competent and attentive
audience relative to whom the referent of  the demonstrative is fixed, or what the
demonstrative refers to is indeterminate.  So instead of  failing to make a prediction, the
audience-control theory makes a clear prediction: in cases where there are several things that
can be reasonably taken to be the content of  a demonstrative, the demonstrative does not
have a determinate referent.
Now, let's see how the indeterminacy response would deal with the cases of  misleading. In the
lie7 case, Jill would take 'here' to refer to Rick's house, while Jack could take 'here' to refer to
his own house, since he is in his own house. According to the indeterminacy response, what
'here' refers to is indeterminate in this case. Taking into consideration what I said about the
case in the previous section, it seems that it is not as clear as Weatherson presents it to be that
'here' refers to Jack's house. Rather, it seems indeterminate what 'here' refers to – it could refer
to either Jack's house or Rick's house.
In the prank case, Bruce cannot reasonably take 'today' to refer to anything. So the audience-
control theory would predict that it does not refer to anything. However, there is also the
intuition that 'today' refers to the day that Weatherson takes it to refer to. On the version of
the audience control-theory that we are considering, Weatherson himself  counts as an
audience, since as I said in the previous section, he reads the message while writing it.
Weatherson would reasonably take 'today' to refer to the day on which the message is written.
This suggests that the audience-control theory, having adopted the indeterminacy response,
would predict as the referent of  'today' in this case is indeterminate. This is because there is a
disagreement between what Weatherson would reasonably take to be the content of  'today'
and what Bruce would reasonably take to be its content. This result is somewhat unsatisfying.
There seems to be more to be said than just that the content if  'today' is indeterminate.
7 Let's assume that Jill expects Jack to be at Rick's house, and Jack does not explicitly say that he is at Rick's
house during the conversation.
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According to this response, every time interlocutors disagree about the content of  a
demonstrative, not much more than that the content is indeterminate can be said. For the
Prank case, there does seem to be a sense in which 'today' refers to the day on which there
actually is a faculty meeting and Weatherson writes the note. The same applies to the Lie case.
The indeterminacy response fails to capture the feeling that there is more to say about what
'here' refers to in that case than that it refers indeterminately. This observation grounds the
second response, which I will present in the next section.
5.2 Content Relativism about Demonstratives
The second response involves an explicit rejection of  an assumption that is accepted by
almost every theory of  demonstratives. The success of  the counterarguments relies entirely on
the audience-control theory subscribing to this assumption. However, it is not necessary that a
proponent of  the audience-control theory accepts it. The assumption is the following:
The Unique Content Assumption
For any usage event A, if  a speaker s uses a demonstrative expression E, then E has at
most one content x on A.
I will argue that if  we give up the Unique Content Assumption, then we have means to
respond to the counterarguments. According to this response, a demonstrative can refer to
more than one thing at once. Given that we still want the content of  a demonstrative to be
fixed by a function from contexts to contents, this proposal makes sense if  we take the
content-fixing context to be a context of  the audience rather than the context of  use, since
there can be only one context of  use per use. But instead of  talking about an audience-
context, I will talk about contexts of  interpretation, because there will be no unique context
of  audience and the audience consists of  interpreters who are embedded in their own context.
To distinguish between occasions, where a demonstrative has different contents relative to
different interpreters, because there is more than one usage event, and occasions where there
is only one usage event, but different contents relative to different interpreters, I will make
clear the distinction between a context of  use and a context of  interpretation. We can take the
context of  use to be the context in which a demonstrative is used, and to consist of  factors
like the speaker, time, location, and possible world. The context of  interpretation is the
context from which a demonstrative in a context of  use is interpreted, and consists of  all the
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factors that can be relevant for fixing the referent of  a demonstrative. Factors that are relevant
for fixing the semantic content of  a demonstrative are things that the interpreter reasonably
takes as evidence of  what the speaker intends to refer to on the assumption that the speaker is
cooperative. This includes demonstrations, things previously referred to in the conversation,
prominent or salient objects in the environment, expressions that the speaker uses, the
linguistic constraints encoded in the demonstrative that the speaker uses, etc. The context of
interpretation is a set of  such relevant features, which are available to the interpreter, given her
background beliefs, perceptual abilities and perspective. One thing which should be noted is
that the speaker herself  can count as such an interpreter. The cues that according to the
audience-based theory fix what the referent is, are cues about what the speaker is meaning to
say. Since this is so, the speaker, having access to her own inner speech, has a different set of
evidence about what she means to refer to. Because of  this, her judgment about what she
refers to can differ from the audience members' interpretation.
Having drawn the distinction between a context of  use and a context of  interpretation, and
given a preliminary conception about what a context of  interpretation is, we can return to
developing an audience-centric view of  demonstratives which embraces interpretation-
sensitivity. Content relativism about demonstratives is the view that demonstratives are
interpretation-sensitive expressions. A demonstrative is interpretation-sensitive if, on a
particular use, it can have one content relative to one interpreter and have another content
relative to another interpreter. Adopting interpretation-sensitivity would allow to
accommodate both the thesis that the content of  a demonstrative is fixed by and identical to
what competent and attentive audience members would reasonably take to be the referent, and
the observation that what different audience members take to be the referent can differ
depending on what cues are available to them and what they believe.
The semantic content of  a demonstrative in a context of  use is fixed by the context of
interpretation. But it seems that not just any context of  interpretation will be suitable as the
context relative to which the demonstrative has a content. There are at least two things that
should be required from the audiences whose context of  interpretation can fix the referent to
avoid placing excess burden on the speaker. Firstly, some audiences are incompetent in the
language that is being used. For example, there might be a child who thinks 'here' always refers
to her mom. When someone says, 'Come here,' she will go to her mom. She will take 'here' to
refer to her mom, but that is only because she is not a competent user of  English. Since she is
not sufficiently familiar with the semantics of  English, her judgment should not fix what the
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semantic content of  'here' is. 
Secondly, sometimes audiences do not pay attention to the speaker's words. For example,
imagine that a history teacher is telling her class about the first world war. She begins by telling
them about the assassination of  Franz Ferdinand. After that, her students stop listening. The
teacher regains their attention only at the end of  the class when she is concluding the lesson.
She says, 'On November 9th, he abdicates.' Her students will take her to refer to the assassin of
Franz Ferdinand instead of  the German Kaiser. Since they did not hear most of  what their
teacher said, the contexts of  the inattentive students should not count as reference-fixing.
These considerations suggest a way to limit the range of  contexts of  interpretation which fix
the semantic content of  a demonstrative. The contexts of  interpretation of  inattentive and
linguistically incompetent audiences should not count as content-fixing because otherwise the
theory would predict that if  the speaker wants to communicate only their intended content,
they would have the responsibility of  making themselves clear to inattentive and incompetent
audiences. This does not seem to be required from speakers. Hence, we do not want our
theory to have this conclusion. The conclusion can be avoided if  the admissible contexts will
be the contexts of  interpreters who are attentive, competent speakers of  the language, and
evaluate available evidence reasonably. Having made the distinction between the context of
use and the context of  interpretation, and restricted the range of  permissible contexts of
interpretation, we can state the view.
Content Relativism about Demonstratives
A demonstrative d refers to x in a context of  use cu and a context of  interpretation ci iff
the audience of  ci would reasonably judge x to be what the speaker of  cu intends to refer
to using d.
Now, I will provide some support for it by appealing to speakers' intuitions in cases where
demonstratives are used. Content Relativism about demonstratives would explain how it is
possible for different audience-members to disagree about what the semantic content of  a
demonstrative is on a given use. In the Re-enactment case, while the context of  use is the
same, the context of  interpretation of  the members of  the audience who know about re-
enactments are different from the context of  interpretation of  those who do not, because they
have different background beliefs. In the context of  interpretation of  an audience member
who knows about the re-enactments, the fact of  the re-enactment is included as a relevant
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factor. Although the audience members disagree about what the semantic content of  'now' is,
neither of  them makes a mistake in coming to judge what they do, since their judgments are
reasonably based on the evidence that is available to them.
It has been assumed that language users' intuitions about the semantic contents of
demonstratives track actual semantic contents. If  we can show that there are cases where
reasonable, attentive and competent people disagree about what the intuitive content of  a
demonstrative is on a particular use, then that would support the thesis that the content of  a
demonstrative can be different relative to different interpreters. If the content of  a
demonstrative is fixed relative to the context of  interpretation, then different intuitions about
the content of  demonstratives do not conflict with each other. All of  the intuitions of
competent speakers may be correct about the content of  the demonstrative. While they will
not be universally correct, they will be correct relative to different interpreters. 
We do not need to consider what people in hypothetical cases would take the referent to be to
support the claim that reasonable people can disagree about what the intuitive semantic
content of  a demonstrative is on a given use. Such disagreements have appeared between
philosophers who theorize about the semantics of  demonstratives. I will provide two
examples. The first example has Stefano Predelli (2002) disagreeing with Romdenh-Romluc
(2002) about what a demonstrative refers to in the Re-enactment case. In the second example,
Martin Montminy (2010) and Christopher Gauker (2008) have different views on what 'that'
refers to in the Tie case, which I presented in the subsection 3.3.2.
Let's consider the first example. As we already know, Romdenh-Romluc (2002) thinks that in
the Re-enactment case, intuitively 'now' refers to the moment of  the utterance. Predelli (2002:
312) has argued that not everyone will agree with this intuition. He claims that he does not
have that intuition. Instead, his intuition seems to be that 'now' refers to the time intended by
the speaker. If  we accept the Unique Content Assumption, then either Romdenh-Romluc or
Predelli has an intuition that fails to track semantic content. But how do we decide which ont
of  them has an incorrect intuition about content? That would require first picking either the
speaker-control theory or the audience-control theory and then rejecting all intuitions that do
not conform to the theory as incorrect. 
Conceiving of  demonstratives as interpretation-sensitive provides a way to explain why
Romdenh-Romluc and Predelli have diverging intuitions without rejecting either of  the
intuitions as incorrect. We can say that the context of  interpretation of  Romdenh-Romluc
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coincides with the context of  interpretation of  the audience and the context of  interpretation
of  Predelli coincides with the context of  interpretation of  the speaker. Both of  their intuitions
track semantic content according to the content relativist response.
Let's move on to the second example. Gauker (2008) and Montminy (2010) disagree with one
another over what the referent of  'that' is in the Tie case. While Gauker has the intuition that
'that' refers to the tie around Harry's neck, Montminy insists that it refers to the tie that Sally
had in mind. If  we accept the Unique Content Assumption, then either Gauker or Montminy
has an intuition that fails to track semantic content. My own intuitions are torn between the
two options. There is a sense in which 'that' refers to what Harry takes it to refer to but there
is also a sense in which it refers to what Sally intends to refer to. There is no objective basis on
which to decide which of  them is mistaken. But if  content relativism about demonstratives is
true, then both Gauker and Montminy can have correct intuitions relative to a context of
interpretation. Accepting that demonstratives are interpretation-sensitive would allow us to
retain that speakers' intuitions reliably track semantic contents. In the Tie case, Gauker's
context of  interpretation coincides with the hearer's and Montminy's context of  interpretation
coincides with the context of  interpretation of  the speaker. 
So far, I have supported content relativism about demonstratives by showing that it can
explain a feature of  speakers' intuitions about cases where demonstratives are used. This
feature is the fact that reasonable, attentive and competent language users sometimes disagree
about what a demonstrative refers to on a given use. Next, I will show how the content
relativist theory allows us to respond to the argument from cases of  misleading. 
According to Weatherson, the audience-control theory makes the false prediction that the
audience cannot be misled about content. In section 4.2, I already cast some doubt on the
conclusion that in the Prank and Lie case, the hearer or reader is mistaken about what the
demonstrative refers to. In this section, I will show that even if  Weatherson's assessment of
what the demonstratives in the cases refer to is partially correct, it is not necessary that the
audience-control theory makes an incorrect prediction. Interpretation-sensitivity can be used
to explain what is going on in the cases. The misleading cases are compatible with the
audience being correct about the content of  the utterance. The sense that in these two
examples, the audience is being misled in some way need not stem from the audience being
misled about content. Rather, they are misled about what the world is like. 
To see how content relativism deals with Weatherson's examples, let's first apply content
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relativism to the Prank case. It seems that since the note is not dated, there is no specific day
that Bruce could reasonably take 'today' to refer to. So, relative to Bruce's context of
interpretation, 'today' does not refer to anything. Relative to Weatherson's context of
interpretation however, 'today' refers to the day on which it is produced, since when
Weatherson considers the sentence he has written from his own context of  interpretation,
given the information he has, that is the most reasonable thing to conclude. Our intuition is
that 'today' refers to the day on which the message is read, and that is true, relative to
Weatherson's context of  interpretation. Since the message is placed under other mail, Bruce is
unable to figure out which day Weatherson intended to refer to, and is misled into believing
that there was a faculty meeting on some previous day. But at the same time, Bruce is not
misled about what the content of  'today' is, since 'today' fails to refer relative to his context of
interpretation. Our intuition that 'today' refers to the day on which the message is written is
explained fact that relative to Weatherson's context of  interpretation 'today' has a referent and
that is the day on which the message is written. But this intuition becomes less strong, if  we
consider the fact that such slips could not be used to successfully communicate without the
slips either having dates on them or there being a system in place which requires that the
pigeonholes are emptied daily.
Even though Bruce is not misled about the content of  'today', there does seem to be some
misleading going on in the situation. But if  Bruce is not being misled about semantic content
then what is he being misled about? The misleading aspect of  the situation comes in just
because the producer of  the message does something to deliberately sidetrack Bruce about
what the world is like. When Weatherson writes 'There is a faculty meeting today' on a piece
of  paper and places it under older mail, he makes Bruce believe that he has missed a faculty
meeting. So he misleads Bruce about the time of  the meeting. The explanation does not
require that the misleading take place on the semantic level. For Bruce to be misled about the
time of  the meeting, it is not required that 'today' semantically refers to  only the day that
Weatherson writes the note.  
To see this, we may imagine a similar case, where the audience is misled, but not about what
the semantic content of  a demonstrative is, since the hearer recognizes the intended referent
as the semantic referent. Suppose that instead of  writing 'There is a faculty meeting today',
Weatherson writes 'There is a faculty meeting tomorrow', and places it on top of  Bruce's
unread mail. Weatherson deliberately says something that he believes to be false and intends to
mislead Bruce. As a result, Bruce thinks that there is a faculty meeting on the next day.
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Weatherson has managed to mislead Bruce about the time of  the meeting, although they
would agree on what the content of  'tomorrow' is.
Let's return to the original description of  the Prank case. It seems that Bruce and Weatherson
disagree about what the referent of  'today' is. Bruce could complain to someone and say, 'I
just found a note saying that there was a faculty meeting, but it was unspecific about the time'
Weatherson could say, 'I left a note in Bruce's mail saying that there's a faculty meeting today.'
This is a case of  disagreement, because Weatherson believes that there is a faculty meeting on
the day he wrote the note, while Bruce does not believe that. Bruce would not me misled
about the reference of  'today', because it does not refer to anything relative to his context. He
would reasonably think that he has missed a meeting, but he would not think that because he
is wrong about what 'today' refers to. Rather, he thinks he has missed the meeting because all
the evidence available to him tells him that there was a meeting earlier in the week. There is no
need to appeal to him having misunderstood what 'today' refers to. He would be correct in
thinking that for him, 'today' refers to nothing.
Next, let's turn to the second example – the Lie case – and apply content relativism to it. In
the example, Jack tells Jill, 'There are a lot of  cute girls here.' 8 If  demonstratives are
interpretation-sensitive, then relative to a reasonable interpreter who knows that Jack is at
home, 'here' refers to Jack's house. Jack himself  is such an interpreter. But relative to Jill, who
has every reason to think that Jack is at Rick's house, 'here' refers to Rick's house. There are
two reasonable interpretations of  'here' and therefore two different semantic contents. But
there is still a sense in which Jill has been misled. She is misled about the location of  Jack,
because Jack takes pains to mislead her, lying and playing loud music. Jill need not additionally
be misled about the content of  'here'. Speech reports can be used to support the claim that
relative to Jack and Jill, 'here' refers to different locations.
What would the interlocutors themselves report about their exchange? Jack could say, 'I told
Jill that there were some cute girls with me.' By this, he would report that the content of  his
utterance was that there were cute girls at his location – which at the time of  the utterance was
his home. Jill, on the other hand, could tell someone, 'Jack told me that he met some girls he
fancied at Rick's place.' In that, she would report Jack as having said that there were cute girls
at Rick's house. So it seems that there can be a disagreement between Jack and Jill about what
'here' refers to. Content relativism about demonstratives allows us to explain how such
8 Again, in order to make Weatherson's argument stronger, let's suppose that Jill already expects Jack to be at 
Rick's house and that Jack does not say, 'I'm at Rick's.'
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disagreements about content are possible.
In conclusion, it seems that the modified audience-control theory can deal with cases where a
speaker uses demonstratives to mislead somebody without giving up the assumption that an
attentive and competent audience cannot be misled about the content of  the demonstrative.
When someone uses a demonstrative to mislead, the interpreter need not be misled about
what the demonstrative refers to if  they are mislead about what the world is like.
5.3 Assessment of  the Responses: Resolving Disagreements
In this section, will assess the two responses by considering how well the responses can handle
observations about how disagreements are resolved.
Firstly, if  content relativism is correct, then it should turn out that once content relativism is
introduced to the people who are disagreeing about what the content of  a demonstrative is in
a context of  use, they should cease disagreeing and adopt the view that they are both correct
relative to their own context of  interpretation, because that is the view that captures the most
facts about the situation. Let's consider the Tie case again. According to content relativism
about demonstratives, 'that' refers to the tie around Harry's neck relative to Harry's context
and to the tie two ties back relative to Sally's context of  interpretation. Suppose that Harry and
Sally were to find out that they take 'that' to refer to different things. Given that content is
relative, once they find out that the other party takes 'that' to have a different content, they
should accept that there is no unique thing that 'that' refers to on that use. That is, by coming
to believe that there is a disagreement about content, it would be reasonable to resolve the
disagreement by concluding that content is relative. However, it is possible that if  Harry and
Sally find out that they take 'that' to refer to different things, then instead of  accepting that
there are several reasonable interpretations, they continue disagreeing.
Let's use a dialogue that Jonas Åkerman devised about the same case as an example of  this.
Harry: I decided to buy the pink-and-green tie because you said it matches my new
jacket. 
Sally: I never said that. I was talking about the yellow tie, which you tried on two ties
before the pink-and-green one. 
Harry: I don’t care which tie you really had in mind. I bought the pink-and-green one
because of  what you said. It’s all your fault! (Åkerman 2015: 495)
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Content relativism entails that both Harry and Sally are correct when they state what was said
relative to their own contexts of  interpretation. But Harry and Sally seem to disagree about
which the unique content 'that' had even after it is revealed that they took content to be
different. 
One response would be that Harry and Sally do not understand what exactly they are
disagreeing about. I agree with Åkerman (2015: 495), who argues these kinds of
disagreements in cases where communication has been unsuccessful are more about
distributing blame for the consequences of  the conversation than they are about semantic
content. In this case, they are disagreeing about whose fault it is that Harry bought an ugly tie.
The second problem with content relativism is that people can think their earlier judgments at
about the semantic content of  an utterance was mistaken. Let's consider the prank case again.
Let the time when Bruce first reads the message, be t1, and the time he finds out when the
meeting actually is, be t2. At t2, Bruce should think that at t1, the content of  'today' was
different than it is on t2. However, it is plausible that he will think that 'today' always had the
same content. At t2, Bruce could think that 'today' always referred to the day on which
Weatherson wrote the note, even when he took it to not refer at all at t1. There are two ways
to respond to this problem. Firstly, it can be stated that when an interpreter, by gaining new
evidence about what the speaker intended to refer to, adopts a new context of  interpretation,
they will evaluate the demonstrative in a context of  use retrospectively, so that their
interpretation is consistent in time. However, this might strike one as an ad hoc solution.
Secondly, it might be that speakers are incompetent in making meta-judgments about how the
content of  a demonstrative can change in time. That would mean that Bruce's judgment about
what the content of  'today' at t1 was should not be trusted at t2. I am not sure that this is a
good solution either. This is a challenge for content relativism about demonstratives that
should be addressed. However, due to the length restrictions on this thesis, I am not able to
explore this question to the full extent.
Considerations about how disagreements about content are resolved do not seem to be such a
challenge for the indeterminacy response. As was shown in the case where Harry and Sally
disagree with each other (described above), interlocutors can have an argument about what the
content of  a demonstrative is on a particular use. In the example, the interlocutors go on
disagreeing after the disagreement is revealed. This would not show that the indeterminacy
response is incorrect, because the speakers are disagreeing about what it is reasonable to take
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to have been said. Although there is no fact of  the matter of  what was said, there are facts of
the matter about what the interlocutors think is reasonably taken as having been said. Hence
the disagreement. The continuing disagreement does not show that there is a determinate
content in this case. 
It is also possible that in some cases, the revelation resolves the disagreement and the
interlocutors converge on a content. Often, the content that they would converge on is the
content that the speaker intended to express. Would this show that the indeterminacy response
fails? No, because even if  further investigation reveals the speaker's referential intention, that
does not make the semantic content at the time of  the utterance determinate and identical to
the intended content. Settling what the speaker intended to say at the time of  his utterance
does not settle the content of  his utterance. So, even if  interlocutors converge on a content at
a later time, it does not show that this was the determinate content all along.
Considerations about how disagreements are resolved seem to favour the indeterminacy
response over content relativism about demonstratives. This is because in order to explain
what is going on when interlocutors discover that there is a disagreement about what the
content of  a demonstrative is on a particular use, content relativism has two options which are
worse than the indeterminacy response. It either needs to come up with a more complicated
explanation than the indeterminacy response or needs to say that some of  language users'
judgments are mistaken.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have defended the audience-control theory against the counterarguments that
have been presented against it. According to the audience-control theory, the semantic content
of  a demonstrative in a context is what an attentive and competent interpreter would
reasonably take to be its semantic content, based on the cues that she can take the speaker to
be exploiting. So far, the counterarguments have not been responded to by the proponents of
the theory. For this reason, as things currently stand, the theory looks defeated. The aim has
been to show that the counterarguments can be responded to.
Altogether I have considered five counterarguments to the audience-control theory. Three of
these arguments – the argument from dispensability of  audiences, the argument from reliance
on conventions, and the undermotivation arguments – can be responded to by relying on the
means that the audience-control theory already has. The two remaining arguments present a
more fundamental challenge to the audience-control theory. These are what I have called the
argument from underspecification and the argument from cases of  misleading.
I have developed two novel solutions which help the audience-control theory to respond to
the two remaining arguments. According to the analysis of  this paper, these problems stem
from there being cases where there is a disagreement between what different conversational
participants can reasonably take to be the referent of  a demonstrative in a given context of
use. According to the first solution – the indeterminacy response – in those cases, the content
of  the demonstrative is indeterminate. According to the second solution – content relativism
about demonstratives – on those occasions, the demonstrative can have one content relative to
one conversational participant, and another content relative to another conversational
participant. I have presented how each of  these responses deals with the counterarguments. I
have also assessed these theories by considering how well they can handle cases where the
disagreement between what the interlocutors take to be the content of  the demonstrative is
revealed. Such cases seem to favour the indeterminacy response over content relativism about
demonstratives. However, content relativism about demonstratives can better capture what is
going on in the disagreement situation before the disagreement is revealed.
The thesis has achieved two things. Firstly, it has contributed to the exploration of  what the
theoretical potential of  content relativism is. Secondly, the thesis has widened the range of
available theories of  demonstratives and has been one step towards placing the audience-
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control theory on par with the speaker-control theory by responding to the counterarguments
that have been presented against it. If  the audience-control theory will adopt either of  the
solutions that were proposed in the thesis, then it is in a much better position than it was
before. With that being said, there is certainly future work to be done on the audience-control
theory. For example, the notions of  reasonable interpretation and competence require further
elaboration.
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Abstract
According to the audience-control theory of  demonstratives, the content of  a demonstrative
in a context is what an attentive and competent audience would reasonably take to be its
content in the context. In this thesis, I will respond to the arguments that have been made
against the this theory, and have not been responded in the literature. Three of  these
arguments can be responded to by relying the existing framework of  the audience-control
theory, worked out by Wettstein (1984) and Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2004). Responding to
the two remaining requires specifying what the theory would predict in cases where the
interlocutors could disagree about what the content of  a demonstrative is. In the thesis, I will
develop two ways to make this specification. According to the first response, in these cases,
the content of  the demonstrative is indeterminate, and according to the second response, the
demonstrative has different content relative to different audience members. The thesis
concludes by assessing these two responses by considering how they handle situations where
disagreements about what a demonstrative refers to are revealed.
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